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Resurrecting War Plan Blue  




 “The United States eventually became the great ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ but only because of 
two fortuitous factors: time and distance. If the continental United States had not been thousands 
of miles from the major battlefields, the nation would not have had the time to properly organize 
for war.”  Historian Kerry E. Irish on World War II mobilization, The Journal of Military 
History, January 2006  
With the emergence of submarine-launched cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, cyber warfare, 
and autonomous unmanned systems, the great ocean barriers may no longer provide the United 
States the time and distance to organize for an extended major conflict. In an era of great power 
competition between technologically advanced nations, advance investment in war preparations 
is required—and may be the best deterrent to future war. This does not necessarily mean an arms 
race, but rather clearly demonstrated preparations to absorb initial contact, employ follow-on 
forces, sustain those forces, and, if necessary, mobilize the nation for an extended conflict.  
Joint Publication 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, addresses the areas that would need 
attention during a mobilization effort—such as manpower, material and equipment, 
transportation, and communications—and incorporates lessons from the most recent conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. But it describes mobilization as “the process of assembling and organizing 
national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies” [emphasis 
added].1  
Will the current environment allow the time to plan then act after hostilities commence?  
In the interwar years, color-coded war plans addressed strategies for dealing with hypothetical 
conflicts with various countries. These documents evolved into the Rainbow Plans just before the 
beginning of World War II. War Plan Blue dealt with defensive plans and preparations the 
United States should take before war, regardless of adversary.2  
The United States today needs a new War Plan Blue effort, a series of studies and actions 
coordinated by the Joint Staff but including the Departments of Homeland Security and 
Commerce, as well as elements of private industry, that would explore strategic choices and 
make recommendations for national actions in preparation for information-age conflict. 
Emerging technologies offer new strategic opportunities in three critical resource areas in 
particular: industry, people, and infrastructure.  
Industry  
Industrial mobilization first requires an established government–industry organization to oversee 
the relationship between the government and suppliers and address any shortcomings. A new 
War Plan Blue would include recommendations for how this organization should be structured, 
so it can be agreed on early by government and private participants. A review of Dwight 
Eisenhower’s 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan is a good start, but new information-age 
industries must be added to the list of suppliers.3  
The government-industry organization’s initial effort would be to assess U.S. industry’s existing 
expansion capacity to repair ships and produce satellites, aircraft, armament, and missile 
systems. This is not new ground, as several studies show industry challenged to meet basic fleet 
maintenance requirements.4 U.S. dependencies on foreign supplies of certain products, materials, 
and minerals must be addressed as well.  
Today, additional attention should be given to industry’s capability to quickly produce 
unmanned systems and inexpensive platforms as weapon deliverers and lift holds. In the robotics 
age of warfare, these systems, produced in numbers, may provide the rapid force augmentation 
needed in a war of capacity. And, if damaged, inexpensive unmanned assets lend themselves to 
rapid replacement instead of lengthy repair. There is a historical precedent: The most numerous 
naval combatants built during World War II were patrol boats, and the most numerous ships 
were small amphibious and cargo ships.5 
People  
Reserve force models generally fall in three categories: individual augmentation, complete unit 
augmentation, and total mission assumption. Each of these models is valid for select mission 
objectives.  
An informal 2016 Naval Postgraduate School study on human mobilization identified several 
critical naval enlisted rates that will be difficult to fill from training resources alone should the 
United States experience attrition. These include machinist mate (Nuclear), gas turbine 
electrician, aviation mechanic, and others requiring long school times for proficiency.6 For 
officers, examples include pilots and nuclear-qualified officers.  
A new War Plan Blue effort would include a study to identify the military and naval specialties 
requiring long training lead time and at risk of attrition. Based on the results of that study, the 
individual augmentation reserve force should be shaped to meet possible demand in an extended 
conflict. Shaping initiatives may include monetary incentives, advanced reserve promotion 
opportunities, and increased training resources to entice select active-duty personnel with these 
skills to the reserves after they transition to civilian life.  
Complete unit augmentation to active-duty forces still would be appropriate in many roles (such 
as infantry, medical services, or battle staffs), but in a robotics age of warfare, complete mission 
assumption offers a new opportunity. Creating entire reserve units dedicated to the maintenance 
and employment of cyber and unmanned systems will provide a corps of warriors ready to 
employ these systems in conflict and offer a venue for closer reserve–active duty coordination in 
exercises. If these systems are able to be built quickly in numbers, the unmanned systems 
industry may provide the very reserve expertise to employ them. A new War Plan Blue effort 
would include a study to assess reservist potential from these industries and recommend 
resources to begin to establish these units.  
The Naval Postgraduate School study further concluded that if current individual recruiting 
restrictions are applied to the U.S. 2030 population, there will be fewer than 1.1 million eligible 
candidates between the ages of 18 and 24 for all services to draw on in general mobilization. A 
focused manpower study effort is needed to verify this finding and understand the impact of 
relaxing some recruiting restrictions if necessary, and how it might impact general labor 
requirements in the population.  
Infrastructure and Sustainment  
National critical infrastructure defense was elevated in importance after the 2001 terrorist 
attacks. However, serious defense preparations against a state actor’s attacks on U.S. military 
and naval bases and civilian ports—particularly those in potential contested regions—has not 
been addressed at the national level since the Cold War. Sea ports and airports necessary for 
long-term sustainment should be identified then reinforced with hardened and redundant 
infrastructure and air and sea defensive systems. Conversely, undeveloped areas that offer 
expeditionary basing need to be identified and plans made for rapid development into 
sustainment basing, even if temporary.  
Both efforts will be complex, requiring coordination with allies, territorial governments, U.S. 
state and local governments, and port captains. A War Plan Blue effort in infrastructure and 
sustainment would require a whole-of-government effort and may best be led by a national 
interagency team commissioned by the President and Congress.  
A Series of Steps, Not One Plan  
These topics are not comprehensive, but they do suggest a series of independent but coordinated 
efforts to increase the nation’s ability to sustain an extended conflict with a national competitor. 
The Joint Staff is well positioned to facilitate these efforts, but a national-level interagency 
organization could be formed to fill this function as well. A serious examination of our nation’s 
capability and capacity for military sustainment and infrastructure defense may be the most 
powerful deterrent to adversary adventurism. And the nature of that mobilization may be heavily 
influenced by the emerging technologies of the information age and robotics warfare. 
1. Joint Publication 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (23 October 2018), ix, 
www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_05.pdf?ver=2018-11-13-170517-383. 
2. Mark E. Grotelueschen, “Joint Planning for Global Warfare: The Development of the 
Rainbow Plans in the United States, 1938–1941, Army History, no. 97 (Fall 2015): 8–27. 
3. Kerry E. Irish, “Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan,” 
The Journal of Military History 70, no. 1 (January 2006): 53. 
4. See, for example, B. Martin, M. E. McMahon, J. Riposo, J. G. Kallimani, A. Bohman, A. 
Ramos, and A. Schendt, A Strategic Assessment of U.S. Navy Ship Maintenance: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2017). 
5. Naval History and Heritage Command, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1938–1944,” 
www.history.navy.mil/. 
6. S. Bay, S. Benavides, L. Fredrick, and A. Hogarth, “Manpower Mobilization Campaign for 
Maritime War 2030,” an informal Naval Postgraduate School study to meet requirements of Joint 
Campaign Analysis course, September 2016. 
Captain Jeffrey E. Kline, United States Navy (Retired)  
Captain Kline retired after 26 years of service, including to two sea commands. He currently is a 
professor of practice in the Naval Postgraduate School Operations Research Department, where 
he teaches campaign analysis, systems analysis, and executive programs in strategic planning 
and risk assessment. He has served on the Chief of Naval Operations’ Fleet Design Advisory 
Board and several Naval Study Board Committees of the National Academies. 
 
